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CHAPTER 4
WHY LAUNCH A BASIC INCOME EXPERIMENT
ABSTRACT
In this chapter I propose to launch a basic income experiment. The limitations of a real life experiment are
entirely different from the limitations of economic models. There is a wide gap between what can be
concluded from the existing literature concerning labour supply responses to non-labour income or from
economic models and the information which is required to assess the economic (un)feasibility of such
major reforms of social security as basic income or negative income tax schemes. Based on the extensively
discussed New Jersey negative income tax experiments and the lessons drawn for any new experiment to
be held in the future, the proposed experiment includes only those groups for which a basic income can be
simulated relatively simply and without many costs and from which substantial and - taking the basic
income discussion into consideration – relevant behavioural reactions can be expected. The insights
obtained from the study of changes in behaviour of experimentals may thus constitute a complementary
source of information compared to that obtained from economic models on the viability of basic income.
1 Introduction
The limited support for BI and the strong support for workfare-oriented policies may well explain why there
are no BI experiments but many welfare-to-work experiments going on. BI and workfare can be seen as
opposed ways to achieve more flexible labour markets. Peck and Theodore (2000, 124) assert that welfare-
to-work experiments “seek to articulate a regulatory strategy concerned to make flexible labour markets
work. ‘Work first’ approaches, in particular, can be seen as part of a wider attempt to realign welfare
provisions, incentive structures and work expectations in light of the ‘realities’ of flexible employment;
their aim is to (re)socialise welfare recipients for contingent work.” However, as argued in the previous
chapters, also a BI can be seen in the light of flexibility. Under a BI scheme a more flexible labour market
may arise because of the elimination of minimum wage legislation and a less comprehensive legislation on
employment conditions. By providing a BI unconditionally, the income and utility
1 which potential workers
derive from this no-work option serves as a floor. The need for minimum wages under the present
conditional scheme suggests that the fall-back position of low wage workers is not strong enough to let
wages on this segment of the labour market be determined by demand and supply forces. Provided the level
of the unconditional grant is around subsistence level, all labour supplied is supplied voluntarily and there
is no reason to protect low-skilled workers through minimum wages. The phenomenon of excess supply
                    
1 The lower is the utility level of the no-work option, the less employers have to pay potential workers to bring them up to
that level (technically, their reservation wage will be lower).2
for, say, low-skilled, unpleasant jobs can no longer be a real obstacle for reaching decent wages and
compensatory wage differentials, since the low skilled workers have the option to refuse jobs until they are
better paid to compensate for the unpleasantness, or until the conditions of employment are improved.
Indeed, one of the likely effects of a switch towards a substantial BI is either a rise in the net income of
workers with unappealing, routine work, or a significant improvement of the employment conditions in
these segments of the labour market, or both, depending on the costs to be incurred in each alternative by
employers in order to recruit enough workers. Also, the need for comprehensive legislation becomes much
less pressing under a BI scheme. Much more can be left to the forces operative on the labour market. There
is no need to have legislation on the (social security) rights of flex-workers, the number of vacation days,
working hours, compulsory retirement, etc. All these issues can be left to the market, since the BI provides
each  potential  worker  with  substantial  bargaining  power  against  employers.  In  principle  at  least,  a
substantial BI allows the possibility to deregulate the labour market, and in this way to combine the
dynamics of American labour markets with the minimum income protection of European welfare states (see
also chapter 2).
Comparing BI and workfare (or the shift towards activating labour policies replacing passive welfare),
it is interesting to note that a BI experiment may serve as the right counter-experiment for all kinds of
workfare-oriented experiments. As argued by Peck and Theodore (ibid., 124-5), the recent popularity of
workfarism in the US and the UK can to a large extent be attributed to the positive results of local workfare
experiments in the early 1990s. Workfare experiments show the effects of mandatory welfare-to-work
programs compared to the normal treatment (e.g. the duty to apply for jobs, the duty to resume work as
soon as possible) of a control group of welfare beneficiaries. Running a workfare and BI experiment
simultaneously may show what a difference it makes if recipients must participate, as a condition of income
support, in programs designed to improve their insertion in paid work as under workfare, or if they can
freely choose themselves what to do as under BI. Because there are no BI experiments going on, we can
only guess what the differences would be. For instance, it may well be the case that workfare experiments
show better results in terms of labour market inclusion, but that BI experiments show better results in terms
of inclusion in all kinds of unpaid work. In any case, comparing the evaluation findings of workfare and
BI experiments may give us some information about the effectiveness of welfare-to-work activities
performed by employment agencies.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a non-exhaustive enumeration of the limitations
of existing research to assess the effects of a major change in social security. Section 3 shows the
equivalence between a BI and a negative income tax (NIT). Section 4 discusses the New Jersey negative
income tax experiments. Although these experiments were held over a quarter of a century ago, some
important lessons can still be drawn for new experiments to be initiated in the future. These are presented
in section 5. Section 6 presents a structure for a new BI experiment, which can serve as a basis for3
discussion about any proposal to start such an experiment. In the final section the conclusions are
elaborated.
2 The limitations of theoretical models and empirical research
On the basis of theoretical microeconomic research
2 something can be said about the direction of the
expected effects, but not about the scale of these effects. Although the economic sustainability of a BI is
controversial, there are some uncontroversial remarks which can be made. Firstly, the implementation of
a BI will reduce the share of GDP which is distributed by the market. Consequently, on average a given
work effort will be less rewarded when compared to the rewards accruing to the same amount of labour in
a scheme of conditional social security. The ultimate effect does however not depend on the higher average
marginal tax rate, since the burden of the marginal tax varies according to one’s position in the labour
market. Social security recipients now face an effective tax rate equal to 100%, while part- and full-time
workers face a much lower rate. The flat tax in the standard BI proposal entails a marginal rate which is
comparable across members of society with a low and with a high income. One of the crucial questions
therefore is whether the negative effects of a higher marginal tax rate for the latter group is greater than the
positive effects of a lower rate for the former group. Still, even more serious is that economic theory does
not yield unambiguous clues about what we can expect for the effect of BI on human capital accumulation
(see below), on low wage levels in the absence of minimum wage legislation and on female labour supply.
In the long term at least three effects can be distinguished which will influence human capital formation
and hence the distribution of earning powers in the future under a BI scheme. Due to the raising of tax rates
required to finance the BI, the net after-tax wage rate will probably be lower under a BI scheme for most
workers. This may give a disincentive to invest in human capital, since every unit of human capital will
then generate a lower stream of net earnings in the future. However, this is not the whole story. Two
counteracting forces work to lower the cost of acquiring human capital: (i) students over the age of 18
engaged in schooling will receive a BI, whereas most of them now have to incur large debts to finance their
study; (ii) with lower net wage rates due to higher tax rates, the foregone earnings of full-time schooling
become smaller.
3 Even if we had reliable forecasts about future net wage differentials between educational
categories, we would also need to know the effect of monetary incentives on human capital formation (i.e.
                    
2 See e.g. Besley (1990) and Creedy (1996).
3 A similar point is made by Atkinson (1995, 135): If the decision is based solely on comparing the expected gain in
earnings with the earnings foregone while training, a tax which is simply proportional would reduce both by the same
percentage, and the balance in the equation is unaffected. If the tax is at rate t, we would simply have a factor (1-t) appearing
on both sides. It is only to the extent that the tax has a graduated marginal rate, falling more heavily on the earnings of
trained labour, that the return to training is reduced. Of course this is an over-simplified representation, and costs such as
university fees may well not be tax-deductible, but the essential point is that human capital investment largely takes the form
of foregone earnings, so that if these earnings would have been taxed, the cost of the investment is reduced as well as the
benefits.4
the allocation of students among educational categories). In sum, one cannot treat earning power, or wage
rates, as exogenous in the long run.
It would be helpful if we would know what the effects are of abolishing the minimum wage, eliminating
the poverty trap and the effect arising from the absence of preconditions on the behaviour of social security
recipients for receiving a social benefit.
4 In recent years we have seen a flourishing, yet unresolved, debate
on the effect of the level of minimum wages on employment.
5 Note that this debate is about the effect of
a small change of minimum wages on employment. What is required here is an estimate of the effect of a
complete elimination of minimum wages, in conjunction with the effect of the removal of the poverty trap
and making the minimum income guarantee unconditional, on labour demand and labour supply which
together will determine the new equilibrium values of wages and employment in the low wage sector under
a BI scheme.
Finally, it is much more difficult to model the process leading to changes in the distribution of family
income and decisions of family members with regard to labour supply than changes in individual income
and labour supply.
6 A standard neo-classical labour supply model where all individuals are taken alike
would probably generate entirely different outcomes compared to when one models family behaviour, e.g.
when using the male chauvinist model. What is at stake here is the radical uncertainty regarding the effect
of a BI on the division of labour within the household. This uncertainty is perhaps responsible for the fact
that the feminist movement has not yet taken a clear stance on the BI proposal. There is the fear that the
participation rate of women will decline because of the BI: the income loss (or opportunity costs) of not
doing paid work becomes less, and a BI can be seen as a disguised wage (‘hush money’) for housekeeping
and childrearing activities. However, even if this fear were realised one can still argue that not much is lost
from the perspective of female emancipation. It is likely that a significant part of the decline in women' s
labour supply would result from women with easy, dead end and low paid part-time jobs quitting their jobs.
It is not very likely that women with interesting, well paid full-time jobs would stop working (de Beer,
1987, 52-53). Moreover, for both men and women who perform a full-time job it becomes more attractive
to work less than full-time: since the share of labour market earnings in household income would become
less under a BI scheme compared to the present scheme, the same reduction in working hours will lead to
a smaller decline in household income under a BI scheme. This may increase the willingness of men to take
a larger share of housekeeping and childrearing responsibilities by working less than full-time. Finally, it
may well be the case that because of the abolishment of minimum wages more low wage and part-time jobs
will become available for women under a BI scheme. The BI could then be seen as an kind of emancipation
                    
4 Present social benefits are surrounded by all kinds of obligations (to apply for jobs, to retrain, to fill in forms every month,
etc.), whereas a BI can be seen as a kind of (anonymous) gift. The sociological gift-exchange theory predicts that gifts have
the tendency to elicit a counter-gift.
5 See e.g. Kennan (1995), Dolado et al. (1996), Greenaway (1996) and Card and Krueger (1995).
6 "To understand family income, one would have to understand not only the process generating other private income sources
(dividends, interest and rent) and public income sources, but also the joint decision-making process among family members
who adjust their labor supply, human capital, household formation and childbearing decisions in reaction to changes in5
fee.
Empirical research on labour supply shows a large variety of outcomes on labour supply decisions resulting
from changes in the tax and transfer system. At best, empirical research of this kind can only give reliable
estimates for small changes in marginal tax rates, or for small changes in the level of social benefit levels.
Attempting to predict the social and economic effects of a major switch from conditional to unconditional
social security is a different matter. Therefore, results obtained from empirical research into the effects of
benefits, taxes and premiums on labour supply and labour demand only offers insight into the effects of
those policy changes which do not cause a fundamental break with the existing system, such as a limited
change in benefit levels or tax rates. On the basis of such research no statement can be made regarding the
consequences of the completely different arrangement of the social security and tax systems resulting from
the introduction of a BI. According to Barry (1997, 161): "... no tax and benefit simulation, however
conscientiously carried out, can make allowance for the changes in behaviour that would arise under an
altered regime. A subsistence-level basic income would face people with an entirely different set of
opportunities and incentives from those facing them now. We can speculate about the way in which they
might respond, but it would be irresponsible to pretend that by cranking a lot of numbers through a
computer we can turn any of that into hard science." To put it in a terse phrase, there is no hard science
concerning the effects of a BI-scheme.
Interviewing a representative sample of the population to survey public opinion is likely to be of little
use either. We run the risk that people do not answer with complete honesty but give a socially acceptable
answer. It is also quite likely that many people do not really know how they would react to the introduction
of a BI, because it differs so much from the existing system. It is only when the consequences of a BI are
personally experienced that the real meaning of a BI is fully realized and an appropriate answer can be
given. The only reasonably trustworthy way to make a statement about the consequences of the introduction
of a BI is conducting a field experiment. Such an experiment would involve a limited group of people in
a limited area who would, during a limited time, receive a BI. By closely following and analysing the
behaviour of this group of experimentals in comparison with a group of controls, not receiving a BI but for
instance being subjected to a workfare scheme, we may get some additional insight into the effects of a BI
on people’s behaviour. Additional, because the information would be complementary to what can be
concluded from back of the envelope calculations on the feasibility of BI, and more important, to the
findings obtained from sophisticated models simulating an economy with unconditional grants replacing
the present scheme of conditional benefits
7 and to the findings of empirical research on labour supply.
There are numerous factors at work which influence labour supply decisions. One cannot hope to include
all these factors simultaneously within the confines of an economic model. Economic models can, at best,
                                                               
outside sources of income, as well as to changes in the earnings of other family members" (Gottschalk, 1997, 22).
7 See the simulation results of Atkinson and Sunderland (1988) and Atkinson (1995) using TAXMOD and of Gelauff and6
isolate the effects of a few of these factors. An experiment may enable us to solve part of the puzzle,
because the limitations of an experiment are of a different nature than those of economic models, whether
theoretical or empirical. The main difference is that models rely on assumptioms, whereas an experiment
allows one to directly observe changes in labour market behaviour.
3 Basic income versus negative income tax
In this and the next section we are mainly dealing with the negative income tax (NIT). Any single tier NIT-
scheme can be described by the level of the income guarantee and the withdrawal rate. Both a NIT and a
BI provide a guaranteed minimum income to individuals or households, independent of labour market
history or current labour market status, and without any work requirement. Whereas the BI is provided to
all irrespective of the level of gross income, the level of the NIT depends on gross income. This may seem
a large difference, but as van Parijs (1992, 4) pointed out, "On paper, an individual negative income tax
and a basic income can yield exactly the same distribution of post-tax-and-transfer incomes". This is
illustrated in the figure below.
If we take t as the tax rate, y as the gross income, t as the tax liability, B as the level of BI and N as the
guarantee level of the NIT, the tax functions for NIT can be written as tNIT(y) = -N + ty (which corresponds
to the vertically shaded area in panel B of the figure as long as gross income is below break-even and to
the horizontally shaded area if gross income is above break-even) and for BI as tBI(y) = ty (which
corresponds to the horizontally shaded area in panel A of the figure). Net disposable income yd can then
be written as:
yd,NIT = y - tNIT(y) = y + N - ty  and   yd,BI = y + B- tBI(y) = y + B - ty
respectively. As can be clearly seen, the functions for net disposable income for equivalent (that is, N = B
and equal tax rates) NIT and BI schemes are the same. The break-even level of income for the NIT and BI
scheme can then be determined by the point at which net and gross income are equal, that is equating net
disposable and gross incomes in the functions of net disposable income (graphically, the points of
intersection C and D of the bold lines representing the post-tax-and-transfer income at various levels of
gross income and the 45 degree line from the origin). For the NIT and the BI scheme the break-even level
of gross income equals N/t and B/t respectively.
                                                               
Graafland (1994) using the model MIMIC of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau.7
Figure 1 about here
All single-tier NIT and BI schemes can thus be defined by two variables, the guarantee level (B or N) and
a single proportional tax rate (t). However, under a NIT scheme, the guarantee level is only paid to those
individuals or households without any income, whereas the BI received does not depend on the level of
gross income. The tax rate of the NIT can be considered as a kind of withdrawal rate as long as gross
income is below the break-even level, because the amount of NIT paid by the government is reduced by
that rate as income rises. Above the break-even level of gross income, the tax rate is just the normal rate
at which gross income is taxed. As can be seen from the figure, the break-even point D is the point at which
the individual or household neither receives a transfer payment (the NIT proper), nor has to pay taxes. This
corresponds with point C in panel A, where the tax liability CE exactly equals the amount of BI received.
The only difference between both schemes is therefore purely administrative, namely whether transfer
payments are made ex ante (BI) or ex post (NIT).
4 The New Jersey income-maintenance experiment
The New Jersey income-maintenance experiment can be considered as one of the first controlled large-scale
field experiments in the field of economics. The details of this experiment are well documented in the three
volumes edited by Kershaw and Fair (1976, Vol. I) and Watts and Rees (1977a,b, Vol. II and III). For sake
of brevity, I will refer to these three volumes as I, II and III. The principal intention of the experiment was
to get reliable information about the work incentives of the non-aged poor under a transfer scheme with an
unconditional guaranteed minimum income around the poverty level (I, xiv). At that time, the NIT was8
taken as a serious alternative to the existing social legislation in the fight against poverty.
8 The prevailing
policy to fight poverty used the conventional instruments of education, manpower training and public
employment programs. It was a policy based on self-help and self-improvement, and its goal was to make
’tax payers’ out of ’tax eaters’ (Lenkowski, 1986, 39). One of the factors responsible for the rising popularity
of the NIT scheme as set out by Nobel laureates Milton Friedman (1962) and James Tobin (1966) was that
the spectre of means-testing, causing more harm than good, seemed to come true: "... Negro men were
unable to earn enough to support their families and so left home in order that their wives and children might
obtain relief" (ibid., 36).
9 The crisis of the welfare state, the welfare ’mess’, induced the President to appoint
a  Commission  on  Income  Maintenance  Programs  to  "examine  any  and  every  plan,  however
unconventional" (II, xxiii). The sharp rise in the number of people enrolled in welfare programs created
the right atmosphere to look for another approach: "... rather than making welfare benefits harder to obtain,
policy should aim at making it more appealing to give them up. Programs should be designed so that
recipients would always have a financial incentive to rely on something other than welfare benefits.
Moreover, this should be done not by lowering benefits themselves (which would have been unfair to the
’truly needy’), but preferably by reducing them by less than the full amount of any additional earnings or
other income a recipient might have. For every extra dollar or pound gained, the public support a person
had been drawing would be reduced by, say, half as much, leaving him better off in total than before. Past
a certain point, he would no longer be eligible for any assistance at all and instead would start paying taxes,
ideally at the same rate by which his benefits had been lowered. This idea was most widely known as the
negative income tax; if it was applied properly, its proponents argued, only those who were really unable
to support themselves would remain on relief" (Lenkowski, 1986, 36). The failure
10 to reduce (the rise in)
the number of welfare recipients, despite the introduction of more severe conditions of entitlement and
special programs designed to help the poor to help themselves, and the rather optimistic view
11 on the
behaviour of welfare recipients under a NIT scheme, mobilized enough support for the NIT-experiments.
Before more detailed information about the design of the NIT-experiments in the USA is presented, there
are a few peculiarities which must be kept in mind when assessing the relevance of the experiments for the
                    
8 Two welfare reform bills issued by President Nixon embodying the idea of a NIT, the Family Assistance Plan and H.R.
1, even passed the House in 1970 and 1971 respectively, but both were ultimately rejected by the Senate. For details about
the political stratagems going on behind these proposals, two books can be highly recommended: Moynihan (1973) and
Lenkowski (1986).
9 See also the figure in Moynihan (1973, 83) which illustrated the following: "As male unemployment rates had gone up,
so had the number of new AFDC cases. Down, down. Up, up. The correlation was among the strongest known to social
science... Then with the onset of the 1960s the relationship weakened abruptly, and by 1963 vanished altogether. Or, rather,
reversed itself. For the next five years the nonwhite male unemployment rate declined steadily and the number of AFDC
cases rose steadily."
10 "Dependency had become a social condition beyond the apparent power of social policy to affect, save possibly at the
margin. This was the heart of the Administration’s understanding of the matter. It is not a judgement that will be found in
the archives. It was not even a judgement. It was simply an awareness of the limits of knowledge that gradually emerged and
thereafter did not need to be dwelt upon or even acknowledged" (ibid., 353).
11 The NIT-plan was not "predicated on the assumption that people don’t want to go to work" (Moynihan, 1973, 340).9
European context. Firstly, the population on welfare at the time the experiment started consisted mainly
of female-headed families, since men were not entitled to social assistance (the only ones who could receive
benefits were those with an unemployment or disability insurance (I, 9)). This is of course a major
difference with the context in which an experiment nowadays would operate. The men enrolled in the New
Jersey experiment were confronted with the fact that for the first time in their life they would receive
welfare benefits, even if work was voluntarily abandoned, if they had no unemployment insurance and if
they were not prepared to do any paid work at all.
12 This may lead to a higher estimate of the negative
labour supply response than what we would expect from the introduction of an unconditional scheme today
in Europe. Nowadays healthy men passing the means-test without any current income are entitled to social
assistance. Those with a high preference for leisure and who have managed to be on the dole cannot reduce
their zero labour supply any further when conditional social security is replaced by a BI scheme. The effect
of cutting back hours of work among those with a low preference for paid work when easy accessible social
security becomes available has to a large extent already manifested itself.
Secondly,  the  primary  focus  of  the  experiment  were  the  labour  supply  responses  to  providing
unconditional social security to low income male earners. Female headed families were already entitled to
AFDC-benefits, and the Social Security Act of 1967 contained a kind of anti-cumulation measure to limit
the effective (withdrawal) tax rate on AFDC benefits to 67% (I, 10). Giving these women the opportunity
to enrol in a NIT-experiment would probably generate little additional information compared with what
was already known. For these reasons, and because the female participation rate was low, it was decided
not to include female-headed families in the experiment.
Thirdly, the ethnic composition of whites, blacks and Spanish-speaking of both the treatment and control
groups was roughly one-third for each over all cities with a NIT-experiment (I, Table 2.3, 36). Labour
supply responses turned out to be significantly different for each of the major ethnic groups (II, 77-85). It
is likely that the ethnic heterogeneity of an experiment in Europe will be much lower.
Adding the cultural differences between the USA and Europe, the long time which passed since the
experiments started, the gradual improvement of conditions of employment since then,
13 the overall
decrease of the working week, and the relatively low poverty level compared with the present social
minimum at which the minimum level of benefits is now pitched, means that the outcomes of the
experiment (for a summary, see I, 20-21) are of limited use for answering the question whether the
introduction of a BI or NIT around the social minimum in Europe today would have a detrimental effect
on labour market participation. Atkinson (1995, 150) states that "The NIT experiments are generally
considered to have reduced the range of uncertainty surrounding the response of hours of work to
                    
12 Lenkowski (1986, 56) states that "... one of the bedrocks of the existing policy [was] the tradition of not providing income
on the basis of need to those able to work".
13 Better conditions of employment reduce the role of net wages as an incentive to elicit work effort and labour supply.
Hence, lower net wages due to the higher required tax rates to finance a BI or NIT scheme will have a lower negative effect
on labour supply.10
taxation..." However, "... there is no necessary reason to expect the results to apply equally in a European
context. Those interested in a BI/FT [BI/flat tax] scheme in Europe might like to consider launching such
an experimental research project, which would serve both to throw light on the economic effects of the
reform and to demonstrate how it would work in reality."
4.1 The design of the New Jersey experiment
Table 1 contains the parameters of the eight NIT-experiments, varying in income guarantee levels and
withdrawal rates, any which together constituted the graduated work incentives experiment in New Jersey.
Table 1. The Negative-Income-Tax Plans Used in the New Jersey Experiment (I, Table 1.3, 10,
adjusted)
   Withdrawal rate (in %)
Income Guarantee
(in % of poverty line)
30 50 70
50 X X
75 X X X
100 X X
125 X
The plans in the upper right corner with high withdrawal rates and low income guarantees are least
attractive and in the lower left corner most attractive to participants. To minimize transfer costs (the income
support received), low income families were more than proportionally allocated to the least attractive plans
in the top rows and higher income families to the most attractive schemes in the bottom rows (I, 13, 96-97).
Aside  from  prospective  transfer  costs,  the  assignment  of  the  number  of  families  to  each  plan  was
determined by a policy weight given to each plan (the 75-50 and 100-50 plan got the highest weights) and
by the expected attrition rate (drop out was expected to be inversely related to the generosity of the plan,
and positively related to pre-enrolment annual income).
14 At the end of the experiment, the overall attrition
                    
14 The highest attrition or drop out rate, 50%, was expected for the controls, since they would only receive the fees for filling
the forms and interviews. This is one of the reasons why the number of controls (632) is almost as large as the number of
experimentals (725).11
rate was 20%; 25% for the controls and 16% for the experimentals (I, 105). As could be expected, the
attrition rate was higher the lower the guarantee level, the higher the withdrawal rate of the plan and the
lower the amount of the last transfer payment (I, Tables 7.3-7.5, 109-111). Most impressive is the amount
of effort spent on keeping attrition to a minimum and the quest to recover data on families who left, even
outside the USA. At stake here is not only the representativeness of the empirical outcomes of the
experiment, but also whether the outcomes could serve as reliable estimates for the costs of a national
program.
15
Sample eligibility was restricted to families having one healthy male and with a family income below 150%
of the poverty line (I, 8).
16 Two reasons were given for this decision: "First, those close to the field
operators wanted to be sure that most of the sample would qualify for significant payments to keep the
goodwill of the experimental participants and to minimize the number who dropped out during the
experiment. Second, OEO [the official sponsor of the experiment] did not want to be in the position of
funding a cash program that was primarily addressed to the nonpoor" (I, 10).
Another choice was between running the experiment nation-wide with participants all over the USA or
running it in compact geographical areas. There were two reasons that led to the latter choice. First,
administrating and monitoring the experiment was much easier when all enrolled families live in the same
area.  Second,  a  nation-wide  experiment  has  the  disadvantage  that  participants  operate  on  different
geographical labour markets which necessitates to disentangle geographical labour market effects from
individual labour supply responses. To compensate for the loss of randomness, New Jersey was chosen
because the unemployment rate there was close to the national average.
4.2 The operations, surveys, and administration
The main purpose of conducting an experiment is to collect information. Obviously, this is very costly. The
actual (and budgeted) administrative and research costs of the experiment were more than twice the actual
transferred income support payments! (I, Table 1.6, 18). The experimentals in the NIT-experiment were
interviewed more than twenty times: a (44-question) screening interview to determine eligibility, a (340-
question) pre-enrolment before, and a follow-up interview after the experiment, twelve regular quarterly
interviews, and six special one-shot interviews (I, 15, 24). Those who were interviewed received $5 per
                    
15 "The people who drop out of the experiment may be the same as those who fail to be included in a national program (those
who fail to register and those who fail to report their income or in other ways fail to maintain their right to benefits). To the
extent that this is the case, the behavioral responses measured in the experiment will be a good measure of the responses that
may be expected in the population as a whole. To the extent, however, that the people who drop out of the experiment differ
significantly from those that remain and to the extent that they could be expected to be included in a national program, the
estimates will be biased in a way that will impair the usefulness of the experiment as a guide to a national program" (I, 117-
8).12
interview. Income had to be reported on a monthly basis, and in return for filling in the income report form
on time, $10 was paid on top of the normal transfer payment, where applicable.
17 Before enrolment, the
participants received a clear article explaining the working of a NIT-scheme,
18 and an enrolment kit
containing the rules of operation, a tax table from which they could read how much one could expect to
receive at various income levels, a payments calendar and instructions for filling in the income report form
(I, 29). The rationale behind the enrolment kit was to limit as much as possible the contact between staff
and families. This was decided in order "... to replicate in so far as possible the operation of a universal
negative-income-tax program. One of the important elements of such a system, in contrast to existing public
assistance programs, would be this lack of direct contact; it was important to learn the extent to which the
families could function without casework contact. In addition, frequent contact could only increase
whatever Hawthorne or other experimental effects there might be" (I, 30).
The selection of the sample (both experimentals and controls) was done on a step-by-step basis. From
a random sample of nearly fifty thousand housing units only three thousand were found eligible for a pre-
enrolment interview. This comprehensive interview further reduced to half the number of those eligible for
actual enrolment. In the end, 1357 families, 725 experimentals and 632 controls, were selected (I, Table
2.1 and 2.3, 31, 36). The characteristics of the final sample were compared with the 1970 Census data to
ensure representativeness (I, Table 2.2, 34). In addition, a separate check was carried out to compare
families who refused enrolment to those who accepted. Only minor differences were found (I, Tables 2.6-
2.9, 40-43). A major factor which may explain why some families refused to participate, given their 1968
annual income, was the small initial transfer payment that they would receive for participation.
Concerning the rules of operation of the experiment, three major decisions had to be made: the definition
of the family, the definition of income, and the accounting period (I, 75-81). A family was defined as
relatives and adopted living with the male family head. Those leaving the family could take with them their
part of the guarantee, but could not start a new filing unit. Regarding family income, decisions had to be
made on whether or not to include items like gifts and inheritances, dividends, earned interest and rental
incomes, life-insurance, rent subsidies, and medical costs. The accounting period was on a four-week or
monthly basis.
The questionnaires covered five major (economic and sociological) topics: work and income patterns
(about job training, job history, wife’s labour force history, child care and welfare history), debts and assets
(ranging from property ownership to the net worth of consumer durables), family life and background
(about family composition, family planning, educational background, religion, hobbies, etc.), political and
social life (about political awareness, social networks) and other assorted topics (e.g. social status, self-
esteem, worry and happiness, attitudes toward work, and job satisfaction) (I, 149-162).
                                                               
16 A major drawback of this decision was that families with both spouses working regularly were underrepresented.
17 The filing fees were forfeited if the income report form was not returned within four weeks. This filing fee was introduced
ten months after the experiment started (I, 54).
18 J. Tobin, J. Pechman and P. Miezscowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, Yale Tax Journal 77, 1967, 1-27.13
5. Lessons drawn from the New Jersey experiments
Thanks to the elaborate documentation
19 of the New Jersey experiments, some important lessons can be
learned for any new experiment. Firstly, for reasons given previously, the NIT-experiments did not include
female-headed families. The reasons for this are no longer valid. Moreover, the female participation rate
has risen sharply since then. An experiment today should therefore include female headed families.
Secondly, although the USA is a large country, the reasons given above to run the experiment in one
confined geographical area seem convincing. Even in smaller European countries there are large differences
between labour markets in different parts of the country. Moreover, administrating the experiment nation-
wide is probably more costly. Thirdly, the main purpose of the experiment is to collect information about
labour supply responses. The quality of this information depends to a large extent on the co-operation of
both experimentals and controls for providing timely and accurate information. For this reason, the
instrument of filing fees which are forfeited if the required information is not adequate or on time is very
useful. Moreover, for the controls and for families with zero transfer payments, the filing fees are the only
rewards for participating in the experiment. Rather generous filing fees serve two purposes: (i) to enhance
the quality of the information and (ii) to reduce the attrition rate among controls and experimentals with
zero transfer payments. Filing fees should of course not be too high, or else they might disturb the
behavioural effects of the BI itself. Finally, the researchers of the New Jersey experiments never set out in
advance what effects they expected to find.
20 To fill this gap it is important that the main effects to be
expected from the introduction of a BI scheme are listed beforehand.
The experiment in the USA was very costly. It is not realistic to expect that a comparable budget will
be made available for an experiment in a smaller European country. In order to keep the total cost of the
experiment on a modest level the following proposals are suggested. First to take into account that the
administrative and research expenses of the New Jersey experiments were more than twice the actual
income support transfer payments. To reduce non-transfer costs, especially interview and research costs,
we propose not to collect information on psychological and sociological effects since these effects were
found negligible. This may almost halve interview and research costs with a likely low loss of useful
information. In order to reduce the amount of transfer payments, we propose to include in the experiment
mainly social assistance recipients and families with an income around the break-even level (see section
6 below). Further, a decision has to be made on the number of plans. The fact that the New Jersey
experiment contained eight different plans was mainly due to the fact that at the time it started, able-bodied
                    
19 Especially the in this paper much cited Vol. I and the appendices, which contain a chronology of events, and official
descriptions of the rules of operation for the program, the definition of income, the definition of the family unit, the filing
periods and procedures and the review board.
20 The researchers involved in the experiment never agreed on, or set down in advance, a summary of what they felt was the
most likely outcome for labour supply. “In retrospect, this is unfortunate. Any attempt to do so now is bound to reflect, to14
men were not entitled to social benefits - unless they had social insurance. In these circumstances, and
given that the non-poor were excluded, it was not difficult to find enough participants for each plan. In
present  circumstances,  one  has  to  take  the  prevailing  welfare  arrangements  into  account.  Now,  an
individualized BI equal to the social minimum for a single person household would mean that two person
households on welfare would gain substantially. This is because the present social assistance benefit for
a two persons household in all European countries is much less than twice the benefit for a single person
household. At the same time, however, an individualized BI significantly below the present levels of social
assistance makes it difficult to find enough participants among single person households. Probably only
participants who expect to stop working or want to engage in full-time schooling during the experiment
would  gain  in  comparison  with  what  they  receive  under  the  current  scheme.  For  these  reasons,  a
differentiated BI, equal to or somewhat below the present social assistance levels, is the most suitable to
experiment with. This means that single person and two person households on welfare would receive a BI
equal  to,  or  somewhat  below,  the  present  social  assistance  benefit,  differentiated  for  household
composition.
Finally, the New Jersey experiments had a duration of three years. An experiment of such a limited
duration impairs the reliability of the effects on the labour supply if these are to be translated into a
permanent unconditional scheme.
21 Given the budget available for the experiment, the more we can save
on administrative, research and transfer costs, the longer the duration of the experiment can be, and the
higher its reliability for assessing the effects of a permanent BI scheme.
6. Design of a new basic income experiment
22
The purport of this section is to outline the structure of a BI experiment, taking into account the insights
obtained from earlier experiments, and to arrive at a better proposal by offering the opportunity to criticize
our proposal. As a result, we hope that at the time some country or city is prepared to conduct such an
experiment a well constructed plan will be available.
There are three reason why a field experiment cannot replicate the real introduction of a universal BI:
                                                               
some extent, our present knowledge of the results and thus understate the degree to which we have been surprised" (II, 14).
21 "Consider first the male household head with a steady job involving hard work and long hours. If he knew that negative
tax payments were permanent, he might instead take a job with lighter work and more normal hours. Yet for a period of three
years, such a shift might seem too risky. At the end of the experiment, he would need the higher earned income but might
be unable to get his old job back. For the steadily employed male head, the probability is that an experiment of limited
duration will have smaller effects on labor supply than will a permanent program... Wives, teenagers, and other adults in the
household are likely to be in and out of the labor force as family circumstances change. To the extent that periods of
withdrawal from the labor force are planned in advance, a temporary experiment encourages the concentration of such
periods during the experimental years, when the costs of not working are lower than normal" (II, 10).
22 This section is written in close collaboration with Paul de Beer.15
1. In a limited experiment it is not possible to change the external circumstances in the same way as would
be the case with the real implementation of a BI. These circumstances include changes in minimum wage,
the wage cost structure of employers, the labour demand (employment levels), shifts in economic structure
between different branches of industry, shortening of labour time etc. Since the behaviour of (potential)
workers (those working and those seeking work) is to a high degree determined by restrictions from the side
of labour demand (i.e. the availability of jobs), the behavioural reactions to a BI will only manifest
themselves to a degree in a limited experiment. On theoretical grounds it may be expected that a BI will
result in a decrease in labour supply when calculated in working hours, but an increase of the labour supply
when calculated in the number of employed persons. This means that the available work will be spread over
a greater number of people. Since the first effect does not occur for the economy as a whole, participants
in the experiment do not ’profit’ from the decrease in the overall labour supply measured in hours, which
would occur with a universal implementation of the BI.
Another effect to be expected, which would not occur in a limited experiment, is that the net income (net
wages plus BI) of workers with relatively unattractive work will increase in comparison with the net income
of workers with relatively more attractive work. If everyone receives a BI, employers would need to attract
employees for unattractive work by means of a higher wage or improved labour conditions. Since only a
small number of people participate in the experiment, employers can attract unemployed people who do
not participate in the experiment. As these are obliged to accept suitable work or else be penalised,
employers would not have to increase wages or improve labour conditions.
2. In practice an introduction of a BI will mean an income improvement for some groups and an income
reduction for others. To clarify this point, both systems are graphically illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 (for
a single breadwinner family who enjoys twice the tax allowance V) with the gross income on the horizontal
and net income on the vertical axis. The line OJAC shows the possible combinations of gross and net
(labour) income for workers and people who have no right to a benefit (mainly dependent housewives),
SAC shows the gross-net trajectory of beneficiaries, both under the present system which is characterised
by a tax free base of OV and a benefit level of OS. For example, someone with a working partner and a
small part-time job earns a gross income of OV. Due to the tax-free base this person is not required to pay
any tax, but he or she will have to pay tax as soon as the gross income is higher than OV. Figure 2 also
illustrates one of the advantages of a BI over the present system, namely the elimination of the poverty trap
SA. Under the present arrangement of social security the effective (marginal) tax rate on social assistance
recipients is very high. This is partially due to the fact that supplementary arrangements such as rent
subsidies and child care subsidies are dependent on income, and also, because working incurs additional
costs. An effective withdrawal rate of about 100% or even higher, is not exceptional. As long as the gross
labour income of someone with a welfare benefit is lower than OE not much will change in net terms
because the benefit and subsidies are deducted pro rata to the earnings. Finally, under the system of BI16
every adult receives an amount of OS or OBs, with Bs the individual BI, but the tax rate on labour income
will be higher than the average rate under the current system. Therefore the line BsD is flatter than the line
JAC.
Figure 2 and 3 about here
The net income of breadwinners with a gross income of OF is not affected (see Figure 3), no matter which
system is adopted (of course, the level of OF depends on the tax rates under both systems). Those with a
gross income lower than OF will improve their net income under a BI scheme. For the experiment this
means that it is unlikely that people whose income deteriorates because of the introduction of a BI (those
with a gross income higher than OF) will be willing to participate in the experiment. Those who are
prepared to do so, for instance because it enables them to work less with a small sacrifice of income, do
not form a representative sample of the group that would suffer from the introduction of a BI. Therefore,
only those for whom the introduction of a BI has a neutral or positive effect will be included in the
experiment. It is no problem that especially in this group undesirable behavioural effects are to be expected.
People whose situation improves due to a BI would, in the opinion of many opponents of BI, withdraw or
partially withdraw from the labour market. In any event the experiment will show whether this effect does
indeed take place. However, the experiment could become rather costly especially if people who profit
financially from a BI take part in it. If this does not form an insurmountable budgetary problem, then there
is no objection to letting these people (all with gross incomes between O and F) take part in the experiment.
If the available budget is limited it would be preferable to let only those participate who hardly profit or
suffer from a BI (that is, those with pre-enrolment gross income near OF).
3. Changes in the tax, premium and subsidy schemes that go hand in hand with the introduction of a BI,
are difficult to simulate. In a limited experiment it will not be possible to change tax rates, premium levies,
and the issue of subsidies. Therefore their effect will need to be represented in the level of the BI itself. As
a consequence of this, for many participants in the experiment the BI will not have the characteristic of a
constant and unconditional amount but of a benefit or subsidy which is greatly dependent on personal
situation and individual behaviour. Taking the previous point into consideration, this means that in practice
the BI will have a largely fictitious character for a large group of people. The simulated amount of the BI
is cancelled out by the simulated increase in taxes or the reduction in subsidies or benefits. To be sure, even
in the existing situation different payments and deductions on the payslip have for most people a fictitious
character. This will apply even more with the BI experiment, because officially there are no changes in the
tax deductions. By giving the participant regularly a summary of their simulated income situation (e.g. a
monthly summary with their fictitious BI, (extra) taxes, subsidies, wage, etc.) the BI can be brought as close
as possible to reality.17
On the basis of all these considerations, it would seem advisable to limit the experiment to those groups
of the population for whom a BI can be relatively simply simulated and without much costs and from whom
substantial and - taking the BI discussion into consideration – relevant behavioural reactions can be
expected. The two groups that meet these criteria are beneficiaries of minimum level benefits (especially
social assistance recipients) and workers who would neither see improvement nor deterioration in their
incomes by the introduction of a BI. In addition prospective entrepreneurs could be considered for inclusion
in the experiment.
Social assistance recipients
Simulation of the BI is not complicated in as far as the group of social assistance recipients is concerned:
they simply retain their current benefits but it is changed into an unconditional benefit equal to, or
somewhat lower than, the current level (see Figure 2). The obligation to seek work would no longer apply
and earning extra money (themselves or their partner) would be possible without a limit. Because the real
introduction of a BI would go together with a lower net wage (because of the necessary tax increase) this
effect could be simulated by deducting part of the extra earnings from the benefit. A tax rate of 50% can
be taken as the lower boundary. By giving single person households and those living together the current
benefit as a BI, we can experiment with two different levels of BI. The benefit of a couple would be divided
into half a benefit for each partner. A decision has to be made whether single people starting to live together
during the experiment can keep their high benefit or cannot. It seems unavoidable that couples who separate
are given the opportunity to get an extra benefit to top-up their BI to the social minimum of a single-person
household.
Workers
For workers at the break-even level initially nothing changes when they receive a BI. This break-even level
is defined as the gross income at which it makes no difference in terms of post-tax-and-transfer income
whether one is subject to the present conditional scheme or to an unconditional scheme.
23 Only workers
whose income is around the break-even level can participate in the BI experiment. The BI that they receive
is compensated by the extra tax they would have to pay with the introduction of a BI (among other reasons
because the tax free amount and the transfer of the tax allowance among partners would cease and because
of loss of earmarked, but income-dependent subsidies). They would only notice the existence of the BI if
something in their situation changed, e.g. if they began to work less. Therefore, at the start of the
experiment, they would receive an explanation of the consequences for their net income resulting from
                    
23 To determine the break-even level, define t’ as the tax rate and V as the tax allowance operative under the conditional
scheme, and t as the tax rate under a scheme with a BI at level B. The break-even level is then determined by the equation
which equates net income at the different schemes, holding gross income (y) constant:
(1 - t’)(y - V) + V = y + B - ty, so  y = (B - t’V)/(t - t’).18
different decisions that they could take during the experiment. If for example someone with a full-time job
worked one day less per week, this would lead to a less than proportionate decrease in net income, instead
of an approximately proportionate income decrease of about 20% which would be the case under the
current system. So the experiment acts as a stimulus for participants to work less.
Somewhat problematic is that those who start to work longer or receive a promotion will earn less in a
BI system than in the current system. Because of the previously mentioned reasons, it is unlikely that this
effect can be expressed in the experiment. For this person, with a gross income now above OF, it would
have been better not to participate in the experiment. Therefore a simulation of the effect of a BI will not
be possible when an income improvement occurs. On theoretical grounds it is unlikely that in the short run
the introduction of an income-neutral BI will lead to a desire to work longer (the so called income effect
is zero while the substitution effect is negative) so the lack of this (possible) aspect does not seem too
serious.
Another problem presents itself with workers who are sole providers. With the real introduction of the
BI the non-earning partner would receive her own BI which would be coupled with an income reduction
for the breadwinner (who, it is true, would also receive a BI but who would have to pay more tax because
of the cessation of breadwinner allowances). Even if total net family income remains the same, it is
probably not possible to simulate the income transfer from the breadwinner to the dependent partner. The
breadwinner would have to be contractually obliged to transfer part of his wage to his partner: it is not
likely that many traditional breadwinners would be prepared to do this (and if they do, they would not form
a representative sample). In such cases the BI of the partner would have to be fictitious and only play a role
if the partner started working, in which case we face again the problem that if the breadwinner does not
work less time than before, the family income would, as a result of the BI, increase by less than under the
present system.
The BI can be well simulated with the so called one and a half earners, that is with couples of which the
man has a full-time job and the woman a part-time job (or the other way around). It is often expected that
these women will cease working, because even without work they would receive their own income. If the
introduction of a BI works neutrally for two-earner families, their situation will improve compared with the
current system if the woman stops working. If this behaviour manifests itself during the experiment on a
large scale (as opponents of the BI expect), it will become rather costly because all women who stop
working receive a BI without consequences for their partners income.
Prospective entrepreneurs
Beside the two categories mentioned above (beneficiaries and workers or families for whom a BI has a
neutral effect) a third group, prospective entrepreneurs, could be considered for inclusion in the experiment.
According to its proponents a BI stimulates prospective entrepreneurs because initially it is not necessary
to earn a full wage. If revenues are equal to costs and no profit made, they still have a BI to live from. The19
population could be called upon to apply to participate in the experiment if they are interested in starting
their own business. Their present social economic position (employed worker, beneficiary, or housewife)
would not be of concern (as long as one is not already independent). Not all of them receive a BI, because
participants have to be coupled with other applicants who would serve as a control group.
The criteria that must be met have to be clearly defined to prevent the experiment from being misused.
For example, workers would be required to terminate their employment (to prevent them from receiving
a double income) and housewives will need to prove that they have started their own business (to prevent
them from using the BI as a housewife wage). The BI of those who close their businesses during the
experiment will have to be stopped (to prevent sham businesses). Furthermore the BI for new independents
will be lowered if they make a profit in order to simulate the effect of higher tax rates.
The cost of the experiment
The suggested limitation of the experiment to only three groups, namely social assistance beneficiaries,
workers with a break-even gross income, and prospective entrepreneurs, is motivated by the wish to keep
the cost of the experiment as low as possible (or, with a given budget, to make the number of participants
as large as possible and to extend its duration), and by research-technical reasons.
In the experiment, the benefit of beneficiaries is replaced by the same amount (or a somewhat lower
amount) as a BI so that initially there will be no extra costs involved. The government may well lose
revenue because the occasional, extra earnings of participants in the experiment can no longer be deducted
from their benefits. However, these losses do not add to the expeniture cost of the experiment. If the BI
proves to be a stimulus to work legally instead of in the black economy, as may often be the case at this
time, the government’s revenue may even improve.
Initially there are no extra costs for workers with a gross income at the break-even level. They do not
experience a change in their net income if they do not change working hours. Their BI is financed from the
higher tax rates they pay when they participate in the experiment. Extra costs only occur when participants
in this group decide to work less. The maximum size of these costs is equal to the number of participants
multiplied by their BI. This cost would only be incurred if all the participants in this group decided to stop
working. For the group of prospective entrepreneurs, the costs which burden the budget of the experiment
apply right from the start. Workers previously in permanent employment or people without an income who
participate as entrepreneur in the experiment, receive a BI every month. Any extra deduction on their profit
will at best only partially compensate for this.
Effects of a basic income to be researched
The emphasis in the experiment will be on the labour market effects. There is much disagreement in this
area, and these effects are of great importance for determining the feasibility and desirability of a BI. In
concrete terms the research is about the consequences of BI on labour supply. Will workers work less or20
will some people even stop work? Will beneficiaries be more prepared to accept low paid or part-time jobs?
Will non-participating partners (’housewives’) seek and take more or less paid work? Will a BI cause
interesting behavioural reactions in all sorts of other areas? Although the latter may not be crucial for the
judgement of BI’s feasibility, it is nonetheless worth watching. For instance, the effects of a BI on
consumption patterns, family composition (living together or separate), role division between men and
women, the way leisure time is spent and things like participating in volunteers work, social participation,
etc. are all possible consequences worth taking into account.
Admittedly, the information that a limited field experiment such as the one suggested here can furnish
falls short of what we need to know to say something relevant about the feasibility of the BI proposal (see
section 2 above). Still, depending on the outcomes, the experiment may provide some useful information.
If those receiving a BI reduce their labour supply significantly in comparison with the control group, then
the opponents of BI have, to say the least, the benefit of doubt in their favour. If experimentals and controls
do not show any significant differences in behaviour, then it cannot be concluded that a BI has no adverse
impacts on total labour supply. It may indeed well be the case that the experimentals perceive the duration
of the experiment too short to change their behaviour. Finally, if experimentals, especially those for whom
the conditional social assistance benefit is replaced by a BI, show a marked increase in labour supply in
comparison with the control group, then this suggests that the bite of the poverty trap is serious and this
would strengthen the plea for a BI. The experiment may show that the opponents of BI are right, but it
cannot conclusively decide the same in favour of the advocates of BI.
Summary and conclusions
If the idea of a BI is ever going to come high on the political agenda, we have to know which kinds of
social and economic effects can be expected by its implementation. Some economic models try to address
this issue, but outcomes are very sensitive to how the labour market is modelled and what model makers
believe to motivate people. A limited field experiment may enable us to fill part of this gap, because the
limitations of empirical research and economic models is of an entirely different nature than the limitations
of a real life experiment. For instance, in the former type of analyses, it is implicitly assumed that
parameters describing the labour market behaviour of economic agents remain constant. Moreover, these
estimated or calibrated parameters are obtained by imposing a particular labour supply function on agents.
The advantage of a real life experiment in this respect is that we can directly measure the labour supply
responses of experimentals compared to those in the control group. Contrary to the results obtained from
empirical research on the labour supply responses of some group to non-labour income, we do not need to
extrapolate the results to other groups, nor are the outcomes influenced by what model makers believe
motivates people.21
The study of the BI proposal is therefore surrounded by great uncertainties with respect to the changes
in citizens’ patterns of behaviour in response to such a reform. I doubt whether any firm conclusions can
be drawn from either theoretical models or empirical research which try to scrutinize the effects of a
substantial BI. With this as the point of departure, three interrelated issues were addressed. Firstly, I argued
that a limited field experiment of a BI may solve part of the puzzle concerning economic feasibility.
Secondly, any new experiment should be held informed of the New Jersey NIT experiments. Although the
outcome  of  these  experiments  cannot  be  considered  representative  for  the  expected  effects  of  the
introduction of a BI in Europe or even the USA today, some important lessons can be drawn for setting up
a new experiment. Finally, field experiments are rather costly ways to collect information, and thereby in
designing this new experiment, we have to sail between Scylla and Charybdis. We must not allow
experimental costs rise too high, and we must try to collect as much relevant information as possible.
Hopefully the proposed design of an experiment may help to overcome some obstacles to the launching
of a BI experiment somewhere in Europe, alongside the many workfare-oriented experiments already in
place.